The Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on 24 February is the worst-case scenario. President Putin launched a major, unprovoked war against a peaceful neighbor to re-draw the borders of Europe in the 21stcentury – a clear breach of international law.
It is hard to assess the significance of statements by the Russian leadership because misleading people about what you are doing, or “maskirovka”, is part of Russian military tactics. But to look at a few:
– President Putin says Ukraine is a hostile country. Ukraine was never hostile to Russia before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. Russian-speakers in the east of the country lived in peace and stability before Russia invaded. Since then, they have faced eight years of conflict. At no point before or since 2014 has Ukraine posed a military threat to Russia.
– Russia is responding to a fascist or “Nazi” threat from Ukraine. A nonsense claim repeating the propaganda playbook from 2014 – when Russia claimed a fascist threat from Ukraine to justify its invasion – and 1961, when builders of the Berlin Wall, designed to stop East Germans leaving for the West, called it an “anti-fascist protection wall”.
An essay by top international lawyer Elizabeth Wilmshurst – who resigned from the British Foreign Office over the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – explains the illegality of Russia’s invasion. (Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank)
Russia is in a perilous cycle of self-harm, with potential long-term damage to itself from invasion of Ukraine – just as in 2014. From 2013-2020 Russian GDP per capita fell 37%. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 boosted approval figures for President Putin; since 2015 they have fallen.
What next? Maximum sanctions will now be triggered. The next hours and days will show the military situation. Like the Russian invasion of 2014, long-term this new invasion is a lose-lose for Russia and its people as well as a catastrophe for the people of Ukraine and a grave threat to European and even world security over the months and years ahead.
Russia-Ukraine war: origins of the crisis
The origins of the crisis lie not in Ukraine but in Moscow. This war is all about keeping Vladimir Putin in power. He fears an invasion of democracy – coming over the border from Ukraine – which could threaten his position. The recent trial of Alexei Navalny, in a prison in Siberia, shows how frightened President Putin is of democracy and accusations of corruption against him. The only threat to Russia is that which a democratic, successful Ukraine would pose to the grip of the Russian leadership on power (see “Why did Russia change its mind?” below).
President Putin may have a secondary, related aim – to secure himself a place in history as the leader who restored Russian “greatness” and to increase what he perceives as Russian security. He may have convinced himself this is what he is doing. In fact, all Russian’s interventions in Ukraine since 2013 have been counter-productive, slowing Russian economic growth and encouraging suspicion of Russian territorial intentions in Ukraine and elsewhere in eastern Europe.
Back in 2014, many Russia experts could not believe that an actual Russia-Ukraine war could break out, on the grounds that Russia would never attack a friendly neighbour and could achieve nothing except to impoverish itself. But Russia did invade. It has now done so again.
The propaganda war
Allegations of “genocide” and “fascism” in Ukraine and supposed threats to Russia are aimed at Russian audiences. The aim is to paint a picture of a supposed military threat, and humanitarian crisis, to justify the Russian invasion.
The Russian people do not generally feel enmity towards Ukraine – on the contrary, most see them as fraternal neighbors. They are skeptical about the case for war and will not want to see major Russian casualties. This is why President Zelenskyy of Ukraine spoke in Russian in his statement on 24 February appealing to them to oppose the war. But the state-controlled Russian media have been beating the war drums for years. If the war is over quickly without major Russian losses, Russians will be unlikely to mount large-scale protests. (Comment: since I wrote this on 24 February I have been surprised by the bravery of many Russians mounting anti-war protests in Russian cities despite the risk of immediate arrest.)
Atrocities of modern wars, such as the missile strike on an apartment block in Kyiv on the morning of 26 February, become instantly visible to people across the world via social media. This may help generate opposition to the war in Ukraine. But the confusion caused by the proliferation of fake images also complicates the picture.
Who really threatens the people of eastern Ukraine?
President Putin’s talk of protecting “Russians” in eastern Ukraine is disingenuous. Before Russian forces entered the region in 2014, there was no separatist movement there. The only reason Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east are not enjoying a normal life is the occupation of these regions by Russian military forces eight years ago and the subsequent conflict.
Before, that they were living in peace and security. It is President Putin who has brought chaos and insecurity into their lives.
A history Lesson
Nationalists of all kinds tend to say “X territory is the ancient home of our people”. For Ukraine and Russia, the key date is 1991.
On 1 December 1991, Ukraine held a referendum on independence from the Soviet Union. 84% of the electorate took part, of whom 92.3% voted for independence. Both Luhansk and Donetsk, the two regions partly occupied by Russia since 2014, voted 83.9% in favor of Ukrainian independence. In Crimea the figure was 54.2%.
One week later, on 8 December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belovezh Accords, declaring that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist. On 21 December, 11 of the 12 remaining Soviet republics – all except Georgia, and the Baltic states, whose independence the Soviet Union had recognised on 6 September 1991 – signed the Alma-Ata Protocol, reiterating the end of the Soviet Union and the creation of a “Confederation of Independent States”. On 25 December Soviet President Gorbachev resigned. The flag of the Soviet Union was lowered at the Kremlin and the flag of Russia hoisted.
Nuclear missiles, the Black Sea Fleet – and economics
The 1991 Belovezh Accords left plenty of loose ends. They included the presence on Ukrainian territory of the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile – leftover Soviet weapons – and the presence in Sevastopol, Crimea, of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The former Soviet republics also shared a currency.
In July 1993, Russia withdrew the Soviet rouble and introduced a new, Russian rouble. This forced the other republics of the former Soviet Union to introduce their own currencies and become economically sovereign. The move echoed the introduction of the Deutschmark in the US, British and French occupation zones of Germany in June 1948: in response, the Soviet Union introduced the Ostmark, creating East Germany as an independent economic entity. It was Russia itself that destroyed the Soviet Union.
To sort out the nuclear weapons, in December 1994, Russia, the US and the UK signed the Budapest Memorandum. In exchange for Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan giving up nuclear weapons on their territory, the signatories promised they would respect those countries’ independence and sovereignty within existing borders; refrain from the threat or the use of force against them; and refrain from using economic pressure on them to influence their policies. Russia, the US and UK did not, however, commit themselves to offering military support to defend against any threat to the sovereignty of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
To sort out the Black Sea Fleet, on 28 May 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed “The Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet”, dividing the fleet and its armaments between them. Ukraine also agreed to lease naval facilities in Sevastopol, Crimea, to Russia for 20 years until 2017 (extended by President Yanukovych in 2010 to 2042) and allowed Russia to maintain up to 25,000 troops and related weaponry in Crimea.
On 31 May 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed “The Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership”, also known as “The Big Treaty”. The treaty promised the inviolability of existing borders; respect for territorial integrity. It committed each side not to invade the other’s country. Ukraine allowed the Treaty to expire in 2019 after Russian forces had annexed Crimea and intervened in the Donbass. Russia had already abrogated both treaties on 31 March 2014, after annexing Crimea.
Ukraine and NATO
Ukraine began to talk about joining NATO in 2005, and applied to join in 2008. Some NATO member states, including the US and the UK and some Eastern European countries, favoured Ukrainian membership. Russia opposed it. Other NATO members, notably France and Germany, feared that offering Ukraine NATO membership, or a path towards it, might provoke Russia. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO put Ukraine’s application on ice, where it has stayed.
In 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support of insurgents in eastern Ukraine, Ukraine renounced its non-aligned status and expressed renewed interest in joining NATO.
Has there been a shift in Ukraine’s closeness to NATO since the Bucharest Summit of 2008. Or since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014? No. The only change is one brought about by Moscow: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 made people across Eastern Europe, especially Ukrainians, more concerned about Russian aggression.
As a Ukrainian commentator wrote in 2014: “Russia, you may have won Crimea. But you have lost Ukraine”.
NATO, for its part, says that decisions to apply for NATO membership are a matter for individual sovereign states and that third countries cannot have a veto on that.
Ukraine and the European Union
Ukraine signed a “Partnership and Co-operation Agreement” with the EU in 1994, designed to boost economic integration. Over the following decade, some EU member states such as Poland and the UK supported granting Ukraine a “European Perspective” – ie acknowledging that Ukraine would one day join the EU. Others, notably Germany and France, did not. But the EU and Ukraine agreed many practical steps that deepened integration without offering a membership perspective.
Later discussion focused on a potential Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, including a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” (DCFTA). This would have integrated Ukraine closely into the EU, giving access to the EU’s “Four Freedoms” – goods, services, capital and people, including visa-free travel. Progress remained stalled over questions about the rule of law in Ukraine; but by November 2013 the EU was ready to sign the DCFTA. So, initially, was Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Yanukovych. But following a U-turn in Russian policy, Moscow pressured Yanukovych not to sign and he backed away from the DCFTA.
Why did Russia change its mind?
The Russian leadership has argued that Ukraine’s EU DCFTA was in some way a surprise, and that it was not properly consulted. In fact, the EU held regular summits with Russia from 1991 onwards, including detailed briefings on Ukraine’s EU integration efforts.
I myself visited Moscow, as British Ambassador to Kyiv, in 2009. Why, I wondered, was Russia so relaxed about Ukraine’s relationship with the EU, which ran contrary to Russia’s efforts to build its own Moscow-dominated “Customs Union” with other former Soviet states? I called on the head of Russia’s Ukraine department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked him if Russia minded Ukraine getting closer to the EU.
‘Not at all,’ he told me. ‘Of course we would rather they joined our Customs Union, but it’s up to them.’
What changed everything were events in Russia itself. In 2011-2013, large-scale pro-democracy demonstrations took place in Moscow and other cities: the so-called “Bolotnaya protests”. It was these protests that convinced President Putin he faced a real threat from democracy washing over from a successful, democratic Ukraine. Russia has since 2000 become an increasingly autocratic state, with increasing pressure on opposition parties – effectively, none now exist – and control of the media. If democracy were to develop in Russia and genuinely free and fair elections were to take place, Putin would face an uncertain future.
The Bolotnaya protests led to a U-turn in Russia’s policy on Ukraine’s approach to the EU, with Moscow forbidding Ukraine’s President Yanukovych to sign the DCFTA in 2013. That in turn precipitated the “Maidan” protests in Kyiv and the ejection of President Yanukovych from power. In practice, Russia’s policy of 2013 backfired, creating a more, rather than less, pro-European Ukraine.
As the Maidan protests created chaos in Kyiv, the Russian leadership saw an opportunity to take back Crimea, and seized it. It also attempted to foment uprisings in various Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine including Odessa. These failed completely in some cities. Even with support from regular Russian troops, by the end of 2014 Russia controlled only half of the two most easterly regions of Ukraine and Crimea – about 7% of the country.
Russian security concerns: a red herring
Russia, like any country, has genuine security concerns. The country was invaded by Napoleon in 1812 and, as the Soviet Union, by Nazi Germany in 1941. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, numerous countries in the east of Europe have joined NATO – including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, and the Baltic states in 2004. Russia opposed all these expansions. Given that NATO was originally established as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union, it is understandable that Russia is neuralgic about its expansion; and about the disappearance of the security belt of Warsaw Pact countries that used to shield it to the west. While NATO may argue that it is defensive, its engagement in the Balkans and the Middle East is hard to describe as such. But the notion that NATO countries would actually attack Russia militarily is far-fetched.
None of Russia’s NATO-related concerns have changed since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. The only countries that have joined NATO since then are Montenegro (2017) and North Macedonia (2020).
More to the point, NATO never promised not to expand eastwards.
The “Two Plus Four” negotiations of 1990, which included the Soviet Union, led to the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany”, signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990. This led to Germany becoming fully sovereign on 15 March 1991.
As part of these negotiations, including those to obtain Soviet agreement to a united Germany remaining in NATO, it was agreed that foreign troops and nuclear weapons would not be stationed in the former East Germany. The agreement does not mention NATO expansion.
It is a matter of dispute whether Hans-Dietrich Genscher or James Baker informally said NATO would not enlarge east of East Germany during these negotiations. In a 2007 speech, Russian President Putin cited a 1990 quote from NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to imply that guarantees about enlargement were made. Putin said “I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.”
Where are those guarantees?
In fact, Wörner was referring to the non-deployment of NATO forces to the territory of the former East Germany after unification. Wörner said: “This will also be true of a united Germany in NATO. The very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees. Moreover we could conceive of a transitional period during which a reduced number of Soviet forces could remain stationed in the present-day GDR. This will meet Soviet concerns about not changing the overall East-West strategic balance.”
The fact is, no-one on the western side made any written or formal guarantees about NATO expansion in 1991. But the debate about whether the Soviet Union could reasonably have inferred from what was said a promise not to expand is a red herring.
The Russian leadership of 2022 has built its own version of history, including a perceived threat from NATO, to justify its actions.
24.2.22 (updated 26.2.22)
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